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Introduction

Non-existence results
In their seminal contribution, Eswaran, Lewis, and Heaps (1983, henceforth labelled "ELH") show that competitive equilibria generally do not exist in exhaustible resource markets, provided there are initial economies of scale in either the extraction or the utilization of the resource as an input in production. Because markets for resources like oil, coal, and gas are very important in contemporary economies and scale effects often observed on resource markets the paper received broad attention. ELH extend their result to the case where firms are realistically allowed to store extracted resources above the ground, stating that "as in the no-storage case, price must jump discontinuously at the terminal time, so that an intertemporal equilibrium does not exist" (ELH p. 162).
The present paper confirms in a very general setup that the result of ELH without storage is correct but derives in detail why the result with storage does not hold. In fact, ELH admit that costless inventories may flatten the consumption path and eliminate price jumps at the end of optimization. But, using an erroneous argument where the non convexity of the cost function is ignored, they conclude that this may not restore equilibrium existence. It is however shown in the current paper that the combination of non convex extraction costs with costless inventories makes it optimum to extract at high rates and to build up inventories in a specific extraction phase and to exclusively sell from inventories in a last phase. Prices and sales follow a smooth profile and equilibrium exists.
We derive the characteristics of extraction, sales, and price profiles of nonrenewable resources using a general framework. As a novelty we obtain that optimum resource extraction with given resource stocks involves increasing extraction quantities over some period of time. While in the standard resource economics literature this is generally seen as an indicator of increasing resource abundance, we show that increasing extraction can be perfectly compatible with constant resource stocks. The reason is that resource extractors need to increasingly exploit economies of scale to obtain constant discounted resource rents. Proofs of existence and nonexistence are fully derived which makes the point of the original contribution of ELH more rigorous. Like ELH we assume non-convex extraction costs, price-taking firms, and the use of costless resource inventories. The maximization problem of the resource-owning firm includes two stock variables, the resource stock below the ground and the inventory stock above the ground, and two control variables, the resource extraction quantity and the sell quantity. For an equilibrium solution to exist, we require the price path not to exhibit (positive) jumps but rather to be continuous in time, in order to avoid the problem that firms wish to postpone production to the time period after the jump.
Our main findings
In this subsection, we provide an overview of our results as well as the intuition behind them. Formal statements and proofs, which involve solving complex dynamic optimization problems, are given in later sections. In all the sections we will successively consider the no-storage and the storage case. Our results for the no-storage case, formally stated in Proposition 1, confirm those of ELH: if storage is excluded, no market equilibrium (in the usual sense provided in Definition 1) exists on resource markets with non-convex extraction costs. The intuition is that, for an equilibrium to exist, prices must increase over time, the usual finding for nonrenewable resource extraction. In the absence of storage, increasing prices are only compatible with decreasing extraction. However, rather than pursuing extraction at quantities lower than those with minimum average cost, it is preferable for the firm to shut down, which generates a discontinuity in supply and an upward jump of the market price. But, such a discontinuous price path would provide incentives for the firm to postpone and stop extraction later, contradicting the existence of a market equilibrium.
When storage becomes possible, however, the previous intuition no longer applies. In fact, even if the extraction path is discontinuous, inventories can be used to generate a continuous sale path, giving rise to a continuous price path. We can show that an equilibrium exists under very general conditions. Moreover, if an equilibrium exists, it has to be of one of the two types depicted in Figure 1 (left and right). To distinguish the two types, we define a threshold resource stock, R * 1 , that depends on cost and demand functions; the formal definition will be given in Equation (37). In the first type of equilibrium, where the initial given resource stock R 0 is below the threshold (R 0 ≤ R * 1 ), firms start building inventories from period zero on. In a first period, extraction path is increasing over time. Then, at some time t * 2 , the firm stops the extraction and starts to sell out of inventories. Sales are continuous and decreasing over time, consistent with a continuously increasing price path in a general equilibrium, depicted in the upper left of the Figure. Resource stock decreases up to time t * 2 while inventories gradually build up and continuously decrease after t * 2 , which can be seen from the lower left in Figure 1 . The second type of equilibrium is obtained when R 0 > R Optimal extraction paths (R 0 > R * tonic. In particular, the shutdown of the firm is always preceded by a period where extraction is rising over time. The intuition is that, instead of using low extraction levels that would generate a too large average extraction cost (because of the fixed maintenance cost), the firm prefers to maintain a relatively high flow of extraction and build inventories -before closing. During the period in which the firm is building inventories the firm's optimal strategy results from a trade off between opposing incentives. On the one hand, the firm aims at extracting resources at a level close to q which is the one that minimizes average extraction costs. On the other hand, because of the discount factor, the firm has incentives to postpone extraction as much as possible, and thus to build the inventories later in time. The simultaneous impact of both incentives leads the firm to chose an increasing extraction path ending in q.
The second type equilibrium includes a period where extraction decreases with time and another where it increases. Interestingly, the period with decreasing extraction comes first. The switch to the increasing extraction period occurs only when resource stocks fall below a given threshold. This means that, here, observing an increasing extraction path is actually an indication of resource scarcity (formally an indication that the amount of resource left is below R * 1 ), while a decreasing extraction path indicates that resource are still abundant, i.e. lie above R *
.
While it can be shown in great generality that equilibria have necessarily to look like the ones shown in Figure 1 , proving that such equilibria always exist requires some additional technical assumptions. These are either related to the initial amount of resources or to the properties of the production function. More precisely, we will show that there exists another resource threshold, labeled R and greater than R * 1 , which depends on the properties of cost and demand functions as well as the discount factor, such that: if R 0 < R there exists a unique equilibrium, while we still have:
We will also show that, with additional conditions, one gets R = +∞. Then, there always exists one and only one equilibrium.
Contribution to literature
In the aftermath of the important ELH contribution, the general aim of literature was to find ways paving the path to restore equilibrium. This seems to be imperative because in reality we find many well-functioning resource markets, despite non-convex cost structures. Since the publication of the ELH paper, research addressed many of the ELH model assumptions, but never resource storage. Prominently, Cairns (1991) and Asheim (1992) use alternative assumptions on market behavior introducing full contestability of markets to get an equilibrium; Cairns (2008) uses an indirect approach basing competitive markets on a limit of oligopolistic equilibria. These authors show that, if there are no fixed extraction costs, the assumption of some firms entering and exiting the market with unbounded frequency is sufficient to restore equilibrium. We will motivate below why and how we think it is appropriate to exclude these "chattering controls" at the firm level for resource extraction. Fisher and Karp (1993) show that the introduction of a backstop technology restores both existence and efficiency, provided that the backstop price is sufficiently low. The realism of assuming a new technology being able to fully replace natural resources is limited; backstops will thus be disregarded in our paper. An equilibrium is also shown to exist when extraction capacity is limited, see Holland (2003); we will not use such a restriction in our analysis. Lozada (1996) compares resource depletion of the production of "normal" commodities and solves the model also in discrete time. He derives that, for U-shaped average cost curves, equilibria sometimes exist when using discrete time. We explain below why we think it is more appropriate to assume a continuous-time framework. Mason (2012) studies the smoothing effect of resource inventories in the presence of stochastic demand, which is a general feature of storage. Furthermore, several papers looking at cost and technologies of nonrenewable resource extraction are equally relevant for the present contribution. Le Van, Schubert, and Nguyen (2010) deal with a non-renewable natural resource producer using a convex-concave technology and derive the emergence of poverty traps in less developed economies. Gaudet, Moreaux, and Salant (2001) look at resource extraction when resource sites and their users are spatially distributed, which entails additional cost of resource production. Finally, Chakravorty, Moreaux, and Tidball (2008) analyze the ordering of resource extraction from different stocks depending on extraction costs. This relates to our case because sales out of (underground) stock involve different cost than those of (above-ground) inventories.
Remarkably, the most general problem of resource extraction with non-convex costs and the realistic assumption of inventories has never been addressed in literature since ELH. The present contribution fills this gap, rectifying one of the central results in resource economics. As resource markets are crucial for the broadly discussed energy and climate issues, our study on resource market equilibria also contributes to formulating adequate energy and climate policies, see e.g. Harstadt (2012). The model assumption of non-convex extraction costs has been confirmed throughout, because set-up activities like drilling wells, building pipelines, searching for deposits, etc. are still highly relevant and will even be more important in the future, when more remote deposits will be explored. At the same time, resource inventories have played an increasingly important role in recent years, see e.g. Mason (2012); their inclusion in an extraction framework is therefore warranted.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model framework. Formal statements and derivations of the findings described in this introduction are provided in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
The setting
Time is assumed to be continuous. We analyze a representative resource firm which is endowed with an initial stock of non renewable resources R 0 and aims at maximizing discounted profits. The firm can choose the flow of resource extraction q and the flow of sales s, which may differ when storage is possible. The levels of resource extraction and sales at time t are denoted q t and s t , respectively. The firm is price taker -like in the original contribution of ELH 1 -and the instantaneous resource price at time t is denoted by P t . Discounted profits are computed using an exogenous discount rate δ.
Central to the analysis is the assumption that extraction costs are not convex. Moreover, we exclude infinitely rapid variations in the extraction flows ("chattering controls") that could be used by the firm to overcome the problems associated with the non-convexity of cost functions.
2 In previous literature, the statements that infinitely rapid variations should be ruled were not precisely formalized in mathematical terms. 3 Rather it was implicitly assumed that standard dynamic optimization methods can be used, which would require preventing very rapid variations in order to be to be correct. Formally speaking, however, with non convex cost and no explicit constraints preventing chattering controls, all so-called "optimal paths" derived using "first-order condition methods" are dominated by (possibly smooth) paths which would use sufficiently rapid variations. Thus, for the analysis to be rigorous, the constraints that prevent chattering controls have to be made explicit. We know that some of these constraints will necessarily be binding. One possibility could be to move to discrete time, that is to impose that the extraction function is step-wise constant. But the solution would then depend on the length of the time period, about which it would be difficult to make convincing arguments. Other possibilities would involve putting bounds on the derivatives of extraction path, but again the solution would depend on the values given to such bounds. In order to avoid making a difficult and arbitrary choice about the length of the time period or the bounds of the derivatives of the extraction path, we focus on a simple framework with non-convex costs where chattering controls can be ruled out in a straightforward manner. It is assumed in our model that there is a maintenance cost to be paid in order to keep the firm active independent of the level of extraction, which reflects costs for keeping a minimum level of security, replacing aging material, or non-compressible labor cost. In addition, we posit that, once the firm is closed, it is not feasible to reopen it. The rationale is that the maintenance of a resource extraction site cannot be disabled temporarily, while dismantling and cleaning-up are costly and hence only done once. These assumptions indeed appear to be more realistic than allowing for infinitely rapid fluctuations of extraction. 4 Specifically, we posit that the extraction of resource quantity q t > 0 at any date t implies a cost f (q t ) + c 0 , where c 0 > 0 is the maintenance cost and f is continuously differentiable and (strictly) convex, with f (0) = 0. The maintenance cost is only supported when the firm is active (q t > 0), but disappear when the firm is closed (q t = 0). 5 The maintenance cost is not a fixed cost that has to be paid whatever happens; it can be avoided by closing the firm. However, its level is independent from the extraction level (when positive) and will be referred as a "fixed maintenance cost" to emphasize that property. Lewis, Matthews and Burnes stress that such costs "often constitute a substantial operation of operating resources" (Lewis, Matthews and Burnes, 1979, p. 227). The assumption that prevents chattering is as follows:
Assumption 1 Reopening of the resource firm is not possible after a shutdown; formally
The assumed cost function is represented in Figure 2 . The non convexity exclusively comes from the fixed maintenance cost c 0 > 0, with Assumption 1 making it impossible to "bypass" it with chattering controls. To be more precise, Assumption 1 is needed to rule out the possibility of having an extraction that would infinitely rapidly alternate between points O and A. Such rapid variations would indeed make it possible to mimic the convex-envelope of the cost function, represented by the dotted line in Figure 2 . We would be back to the convex extraction cost problem about which everything is well-known.
Our setting, with a fixed maintenance cost, is described as a "type 1 nonconvexity" in ELH. Their contribution extends to more general nonconvexities, but do not formalize the constraints that would rule out chattering controls. Rather than 4 Literature admitting chattering control uses models with economies of scale but without fixed costs like we assume here, see Cairns (1991) and Asheim (1992) . 5 To lighten notation, the dependency in time is denoted by a subscript, i.e. we denote f t for f (t). following this hazardous path which consists in discussing an optimization problem without making all binding constraints explicit, we prefer to restrict the analysis to this so-called type 1 nonconvexity. Moreover, since our objective is to demonstrate the possibility of equilibrium existence, there is not much loss to focus on this setting which ELH view as the one where equilibrium non-existence (ELH, p. 155) is the most obvious. In fact, as will become clear below, existence and non existence of market equilibrium with that kind of nonconvexity is related to the choice of the closing time, just as in ELH.
We denote by q the extraction level that minimizes the average extraction cost. That is:
Looking at the derivative of
, we see that q could also be defined as the solution to the equation:
which means that q is at the same time the level of extraction where average cost equals marginal cost.
Resource stock (below the ground) at time t is denoted by R t , while the level of resources stored above the ground at time t is I t . By observing matter conservation we have
It will be assumed in all cases that for inventories we have I t=0 = 0 and I t ≥ 0 for all t. When storage is allowed it is assumed to be costless, like in the contribution of ELH. For a given price path P t , the problem of the firms involves finding a flow of extraction and sale that solves
s.t.
where 1 q t>0 denotes a dummy variable equal to 1 if q t > 0 and to zero if q t = 0. The no-storage and storage cases will only differ by the assumption on whether I t is constrained or not to be equal to zero; in the no-storage case, the additional assumption I t = 0 for all t is introduced. The demand side of the economy does not need to be modeled explicitly. We will simply assume that a demand for s t will only be met for a price g(s t ). The inverse demand function g(.) is assumed to be decreasing; g(0) is finite. The paper is about the existence of market equilibria. Formally:
Definition 1 (Market equilibrium) A market equilibrium is a price trajectory P * t and flows of extractions (q * t ) and sales (s * t ) such that:
• (Rationality) Extraction flows and sales (q * t and s * t ) are those that maximize firm profit when the price path is P * t ,
• (Market clearing) For all t we have P * t = g(s * t ).
We investigate whether such equilibria may exist, considering in turn the cases where storage is ruled out or allowed. In both settings an obvious answer can be provided when
. In this case, there are no potential gains from trade, and there always exists a unique equilibrium. It corresponds to the case where the firm never starts operations and nothing is extracted. To exclude this degenerate case, we introduce the following assumption.
Assumption 2 There are potential gains from trade; i.e. formally we have
This assumption is a minimal requirement for the question we address to be of interest. The next sections provides formal statements and proofs for the results discussed above. We look in turn at the no-storage and the storage case.
3 Extraction without storage
The setup
Ruling out storage means that I t has to equal zero at all periods of time, and thus s t = q t . The firm's problem involves finding a flow of extraction (or sale) that solves:
It is possible to show that there cannot be a price path P * t and a solution q * t of the the problem (4) such that P * t = g(q * t ) for all t. That leads to following statement: Proposition 1 (ELH, no existence without storage) In the absence of storage a market equilibrium does not exist.
Proof. The proof is split into two parts. In the first, given in Section 3.2, we use necessary conditions to restrict the set of potential equilibrium paths. In the second, provided in Section 3.3, we show that none of these potential equilibrium paths can be an equilibrium.
Potential equilibrium paths
Formally, we call a "potential equilibrium path" a path that fulfills the market clearing conditions and the first order conditions associated to the firm's optimization problem. If an equilibrium were to exist it would necessarily be one of these potential equilibrium paths. However, due to the non-convexity of the cost function, fulfilling the first order conditions is not sufficient to insure the optimality of the firms strategy. The question about whether these potential equilibrium paths are indeed equilibrium paths will be explored in Section 3.3.
We provide a detailed analysis of the case without storage in order to show our procedure as clear as possible and to motivate the later case with inventories. The first order conditions associated with the firm's problem are straightforward to establish. In the system (4), there is one (real) state variable, R, and one (real) control variable, q. Denoting by p the (unique) real co-state variable, the Hamiltonian of the system (4) reads as follows:
The maximum principle yields that the three following equations hold:
where the * superscript is used to denote the solution of the optimization problem. Equation (5) implies that p t = p 0 for all t. Equation (7) is strictly concave for a > 0, which implies that q * solves:
or: q * t = 0.
We check that the Hamiltonian is zero whenever q * t = 0. For any other date we obtain:
). The case that extraction lasts forever can be ruled out as it would imply that there exist long periods with very low extraction levels, for which the average extraction cost would be very high. But this cannot be optimal for the firm, since the price is known to remain below or equal g(0), which is finite. We thus denote by t f the final extraction date. When q * t = 0 (that is for t > t f ) we have H(R, p, q * , t) = 0. Also at the terminal date the Hamiltonian has to be equal to zero, H(R, p, q
Moreover, the map q → qf (q) − f (q) − c 0 is strictly increasing over R + and equal to zero when q = q. Therefore q > 0 is the only solution to H(R, p, q, t) = 0, implying
At all other dates, the Hamiltonian has to be positive (otherwise the resource firm prefers q * = 0, which is an absorbing state), meaning that q * t ≥ q as long as the extraction period is not over.
From (8) we can deduce that, for any t between 0 and t f , we have for prices and marginal extraction costs:
In equilibrium, the price of the resource must verify P t = g(q * t ). We define the function for marginal extraction rent π : R + → R as follows:
The function π is strictly decreasing in q. In equilibrium, equation (9) implies that:
In an equilibrium resource stocks have to be fully exhausted. Otherwise the firm would have interest in postponing its shutdown. The resource constraint imposes that t f is thus defined as the unique date such that the following equality holds:
Finally, the optimal price path P * is defined by:
Profitable deviation from equilibrium
In order to show that an equilibrium does not exist, we will derive that, when the price path is P * (t) = g(π −1 (π(q)e −δ(t f −t) )) for 0 ≤ t ≤ t f and g(0) afterwards, it is indeed in the interest of the firm to deviate from the strategy depicted above. The deviation is simple and involves lowering extraction by dq during dt period of time before t f , and extracting the dt.dq amount of resources left at rate q during dt.dperiods of time after t f . The loss of income due to the sales that no longer occur before t f is given by e −δt f g(q)dt.dq while the gain in income for sales after t f is e −δt f g(0)dt.dq. As for the costs, they are diminished by e −δt f f (q)dt.dq before t f and increased by
after t f . So the overall variation in profit is proportional to:
The deviation is thus profitable, which means that the path obtained in Section 3.2 cannot be an equilibrium. But that path was shown to be the only potential equilibrium. The conclusion is that no equilibrium exists in the no-storage case, which proves Proposition 1.
Extraction with storage 4.1 The setup
We now consider the case where storage becomes possible (i.e., the constraint I t = 0 is relaxed) and investigate whether a market equilibrium exists. The strategy will be very similar to the no-storage case, with -however -very different results in the end.
In the first section we look at all potential equilibrium paths, just like in Section 3.2.
The problem is of course more complex, as there are now two control variables and two stocks instead of only one, but as can be seen in Proposition 3, we are able to provide a full characterization of the potential equilibrium paths. They have to be like the ones depicted in Figure 1 . The difference with the no-storage case mainly comes from the second part of the analysis where we discuss whether these potential equilibrium paths could be real equilibrium paths. In contradistinction with the no-storage case, where no equilibrium exists, we will show that, under some broad technical conditions, these potential equilibrium paths are in fact true equilibrium paths.
As dealing with the storage case significantly increases the complexity of the problem, we replace Assumption 2 by a slightly stronger statement, which is Assumption 3 The inverse demand and cost functions are such that:
This assumption rules out the possibility of having an equilibrium path where some but not all resources are extracted. 6 In case of storage, there are still some sales (from inventories) after the firm closes. The market price is then typically lower than g(0) just after the end of the extraction period. Assumption 2 is then no longer sufficient to guarantee that all resources must be extracted. However, it will be shown that sales from inventory only occur at a rate lower than q, the market price being then above g(q). Whenever Assumption 3 is verified, the firm would prefer to extract the remaining resources at rate q rather than closing and leaving them under the ground for ever.
In presence of storage, the problem of the firm is given in Equation (3) with no additional constraint. As our objective is to prove that general equilibrium may exist we restrict, without loss of generality, our attention to a price path that is continuous. 7 We consider the optimal extraction problem when storage is possible and start with a result on the different time periods.
Proposition 2 (Different periods) If an equilibrium exists, optimal extraction with storage is characterized by three dates 0 ≤ t *
• between dates 0 to t * 1 , there is extraction without storage;
• between dates t * 1 and t * 2 , there is positive extraction, inventories build up, and the extraction stops at date t * 2 ;
• between dates t * 2 and t * f , the inventory is sold and is exhausted at date t * f .
Proof. Looking at whether inventories I t and the extraction flows q t are positive or equal to zero we can distinguish four states. State 1. I t = 0 and q t = 0: The firm is no longer extracting, has no positive inventory and, because of Assumption 1, cannot reopen. Such a state is thus an absorbing state.
State 2. I t > 0 and q t = 0: There is no extraction but the firm has positive inventories, which it is selling observing demand g(.). Inventory is exhausted when sales become zero. As the firm cannot reopen, State 2 is necessarily followed in finite time by State 1.
State 3. I t > 0 and q t > 0: Given that average extraction costs tend to +∞ when q tends to zero, such a state with positive extraction cannot last for ever in an equilibrium. Moreover, as will be shown in Section 4.2.3, in an equilibrium one must have ∂It ∂t > 0 in a period where I t > 0 and q t > 0. Thus State 3 can only be followed by State 2. Moreover, since reopening is not possible, the only other period that may precede State 3, if any, is State 4.
State 4. I t = 0 and q t > 0: Again, such a state cannot last for ever in an equilibrium since that average extraction costs tend to +∞ when q tends to zero. From the previous section, we know it cannot be followed by State 1 in an equilibrium (otherwise we would have a contradiction of Proposition 1). Nor can it be followed by State 2, since building inventories requires having q t > 0. Thus, if such a state exists, it is necessarily followed by State 3.
From Proposition 2 we conclude that only two types of trajectories are possible. 
Potential equilibrium paths
Proposition 3 (Characterization of optimal paths with storage) If the equilibrium with possible storage exists, we have that
• resource sales are continuously decreasing and necessarily reach zero in finite time,
• the price is continuously increasing up to the maximal value g(0),
• extraction quantities are decreasing in the initial period without storage (if this period exists) but unambiguously increasing throughout the period in which inventories are built up,
• the size of initial resource stock unambiguously determines whether the initial period without inventories exists.
Proof. We present the detailed proof in the following Subsections 4. 
Optimal controls
We start our proof by formally characterizing the controls for the two possible trajectories t * 1 = 0 and t * 1 > 0.
There is no period of extraction without storage; the dynamics of optimal controls are given by:
where the dates t * 2 and t * f are determined as follows:
The resource constraint pins down the values s * 0 and q * 0 :
The optimal price path P * is determined as follows:
Case 2. t *
There is a period of extraction prior to building up storage. The dynamics of optimal controls are then given by:
where the dates t * 1 , t * 2 and t * f are determined as follows:
.
The resource constraint between dates t * 1 and t * 2 pins down the values q * 1 :
while the resource constraint between dates 0 and t * 1 pins down q * 0 :
We are now ready to analyze the different States in the following Subsections.
Extraction without storage (State 4)
Before date t 1 , the inventory is zero, which implies that s t = q t . The firm's program is
During this time interval the situation is very similar to extraction studied in Section 3.1. There is a single control q and it is straightforward to prove that the co-state variable associated to the state variable R is constant and equal to e −δt (P * t − f (q * t )), where the optimal extraction path is denoted q * and the optimal price path P * . Moreover, the transversality condition at date t 1 imposes that the co-state associated to the state variable R is continuous in t 1 , when exiting the zone of a binding constraint on the state variable I. Since the co-state is constant both before and after t 1 , its value must be the same for all t between 0 and t 2 :
More specifically, between 0 and t 1 , the optimal extraction and the optimal price at the equilibrium are characterized as follows:
Equation (27) together with the continuity of the price (that we impose for the equilibrium to hold), implies that the optimal extraction is continuous over [0, t 2 ], which in turns implies that at date t 1 , the optimal sale flow is equal to the optimal extraction flow (otherwise the price would be discontinuous):
where q 1 ∈ R + denotes the common value.
Extraction and storage (State 3)
State 3 is the central phase of the problem exhibiting simultaneous extraction and storage. In order to use standard notations in optimal control, we define B I = {(R, I) ∈ R 2 | − I ≤ 0} and B R = {(R, I) ∈ R 2 | − R ≤ 0}. As long as state variables do not belong to the frontier of one of this set for a positive measure of time, the firm can manage two controls: the extraction flow q and the sale flow s. We denote by [t 1 , t 2 ] the time interval for which the two controls are available. The frontier of B R is absorbing and as explained below, it is not possible to reach the frontier of B I once in [t 1 , t 2 ]. It must therefore be the case that at date t 1 , the inventory is null and that at date t 2 , the resources are exhausted. More precisely, total resource stock R t varies between R 1 and 0, where R 1 is the remaining level of resources at date t 1 , which obviously depends on the firm's behavior before t 1 . The date t 2 is defined as the first date at which the resources are exhausted. Inventory I is zero at the initial date t 1 and needs to remain positive between both dates (the firm cannot sell resources that have not been extracted).
The resource firm's program between dates t 1 and t 2 is as follows:
The optimal control program (29) features two state constraints: inventory and resources both have to remain non-negative over the period [t 1 , t 2 ]. The period [t 1 , t 2 ] is precisely defined as the period of time during which the two controls are available.
If we denote by p = [p R , p I ] : R + → R 2 the vector of co-state variables corresponding to the two state variables R and I, the Hamiltonian of the system (29) can be expressed as follows:
The Pontryagin Maximum Principle tells us that state and co-state variables verify the following equations for all t ∈ [t 1 , t 2 ]:
and that the Hamiltonian solves:
We deduce that co-state variables are constant and that for all t ∈ [t 1 , t 2 ], the optimal controls (q * , s * ) verify the following equations.
This implies that we must have q * t > 0 at the equilibrium. Moreover, at the equilibrium, we cannot have s * t = ∞ or s * t = 0: It must therefore be the case that the optimal price path P * is such that for all t ∈ [t 1 , t 2 ], we have:
and
From this expression we derive that q * t is increasing over [t 1 , t 2 ], while s * t is decreasing. Increasing extraction over time emerges because only extension of the extraction quantity allows the firm to keep discounted marginal cost constant, as requested by Eqn. (31). This proves the middle part of Proposition 3. Moreover since I t 1 = 0 and stocks cannot be negative, we must have q * t * 1 ≥ s * t *
1
. It follows that we can never obtain a null inventory in [t 1 , t 2 ]: the set B I described above cannot be reached. This confirms that the no-inventory phase can only occur at the beginning of the extraction.
The Hamiltonian expression therefore becomes:
Depletion of the storage (State 2)
Starting from date t 2 there is no more extraction. Since re-opening is impossible, the firm is left with a single control s. The firm's program becomes:
Using the Maximum principle, we obtain that e −δt P * t must be constant at the equilibrium for any t ∈ [t 2 , t f ]. Since from (30), we already know that e −δt P * t is also constant for t ∈ [t 1 , t 2 ]. We deduce that for the price to be continuous, we must have:
Moreover, for the price to be continuous after date t f , the sale value at date t f must be zero: s * t f = 0, which implies that:
where the continuity of the price implies that the optimal sale flow s * is also contin-
We remark that the Hamiltonian is zero in [t 1 , t f ]. The continuity of the Hamiltonian in t 1 implies from (32) that q * t 2 = q (where q is defined in (1)) and (31) becomes
Initial resource endowment
We have two conditions for resource quantities: the first states that total extracted quantity is equal to R 0 , while the second says that everything that is sold should actually be extracted. This last condition implies that:
Using equations (34) and (35), we obtain that the above condition becomes:
Using a change of variable (x = f −1 (e δ(t−t 2 ) f (q)) in the first integral and x = g −1 (e δ(t−t f ) g(0)) in the second one), we obtain:
with q t 1 ≥ s t 1 ≥ 0 (the sold quantity should be greater than the extracted since there is no inventory at t 1 ). We define a maximal quantity R * 1 that can be extracted between dates t * 1 and t * 2 when q t * 
Since q →
dx is strictly decreasing, positive in 0 and negative in q, it is clear from the second part of equality that q * 1 is well-defined, unique and in [0, q]. Moreover, the quantity R * 1 > 0 is strictly positive. We get the two cases of Subsection 4.2.1, that is either t * 1 = 0 or t * 1 > 0, depending on whether R 0 is greater than R * 1 or not. If R 0 ≤ R * 1 , there is no period of extraction without storage. If R 0 > R * 1 , there is a period of extraction without storage, whose length corresponds to the time needed to extract the quantity R 0 − R * (14) and (15). In the second case when R 0 > R * 1 , the optimal control q * is characterized by its initial value q * 0 ≥ q * 1 defined in equation (24), while dates t * 1 , t * 2 and t * f are defined in equations (21), (22) and (23).
Since we have by now fully characterized extraction and sales paths in the different States and derived the impact of initial resource endowment the proof of Proposition 3 is completed.
Equilibrium existence
Having obtained a precise description of all potential equilibrium paths, we now investigate whether these paths may actually correspond to market equilibria. The question is whether the strategy of the firm depicted in Proposition 3 is actually the optimal strategy of the firm (prices being considered as given). We know that the optimal strategy must fulfill the first order conditions. However there may be several trajectories that fulfill the first order conditions but assume different terminal dates of extraction (which themselves determine the optimal date at which inventories start to be built).
General functions
We first state the following result:
Proposition 4 (Equilibrium existence) There exists a resource level R > R * 1
(possibly equal to infinity), such that if R 0 < R, an equilibrium to the optimal extraction problem always exists.
Proof. The proof that can be found in Appendix A involves looking at whether there could be profitable deviations from the potential equilibrium path for the firm. Actually, three deviations have to be considered: (i) the firm may choose to extract but to leave resources below the ground, (ii) the firm may choose not to start the extraction and (iii) the firm may choose to end the extraction at another date than t * 2 while extracting everything.
First, the firm may choose to extract but not everything. In Appendix, we rule out the possibility of such marginal deviations and show that, once the firm has started the extraction, it will only stop when resources below the ground are exhausted.
Second, the firm may choose not to start the extraction, if the intertemporal profit associated to extracting R 0 with the price path P * is negative. Indeed, due to the payment of a maintenance cost c 0 , it is not always the case that the extraction generates positive intertemporal profits (as it is the case with standard convex costs). However, Assumption 3 guarantees that at least when the amount of initial resources is not too large, the intertemporal profit is positive, so that the firm always opts for extracting. The intuition is as follows. Assumption 3 (i.e., π(q) > 0) and the fact that the marginal profit π is a decreasing function of the extraction flow imply that q should not be too large. Moreover, using the definition of q in equation (2), the maintenance cost can be expressed as an increasing function of q. Therefore, Assumption 3 can also be interpreted as the maintenance cost c 0 being not too large. However, even though the maintenance cost is not too high, the intertemporal profit might be negative when the payment for the maintenance cost lasts for too long, i.e., when the quantity R 0 to extract is very large. In consequence, we need to impose an upper bound R a on this initial quantity R 0 to guarantee the positivity of intertemporal profits. We can show that the bound R a is strictly greater than R * 1 . The case of R a being infinite corresponds to the case when it is always optimal to fully exhaust the resource.
Third, the firm may extract the whole stock R 0 but opt for an extraction date which is different from the optimal date t * 2 . We need to distinguish two cases depending on whether R 0 is smaller than R * 1 or not. In the first case when R 0 ≤ R * 1 , we prove that if the extraction stops before (resp. after) the optimal date t * 2 , the firm will extract less than (resp. more) than R 0 . Therefore, there is no possible deviation and the only extraction date that is compatible with the resource constraint is t * 2 . The firm follows thus the optimal extraction path. Regarding the sales path, there is no deviation that provides a strictly greater profit when following the optimal sales path. In short, when R 0 ≤ R * 1 , the firm follows optimal extraction paths both for extracting and selling. When R 0 > R * 1 , as for the deviation with respect to the extraction quantity, we cannot rule out all deviations with respect to the final extraction date. The firm may opt for an earlier or a later final extraction date. The intuition is as follows. On the one hand, since the optimal extraction path is non-monotonic when R 0 > R * 1 (see Figure 1 or Proposition 3 for example), it is possible that the firm stops extracting earlier, while it leaves nothing in the ground and extracts R 0 . Stopping the extraction earlier may yield a higher profit because of the fixed maintenance cost c 0 that will be paid for a shorter period of time. On the other hand, an extraction stopping later than the optimal date may also yield a higher profit, even if it is slightly less intuitive. Indeed, since the price path is an increasing function of time and the optimal extraction path non-monotonic, the firm may choose to postpone the extraction date to take advantage of the higher price at later dates that may compensate for paying the maintenance cost for a longer period of time. A later final extraction date may yield a higher profit. As a consequence, to circumvent these difficulties, we define a threshold R b for the amount of initial resources, below which the firm always follows the optimal extraction path and never deviates. In the appendix we prove that such a threshold exists and is strictly greater than R * 1 . The case of R b being infinite corresponds to the case when the firm always follows the optimal extraction path.
Finally, as long as the total stock of resources is below the level R = min(R a , R b ), there is no possible deviation and the equilibrium always exists.
The fact that R > R * 1 indicates that both equilibrium paths discussed in Proposition 3 and illustrated in Figure 1 can be observed.
Specifying cost and demand functions
As a complement to Proposition 4, we now demonstrate, that under some additional assumptions on the cost and inverse demand function, we have R = +∞, which implies the existence of an equilibrium whatever the initial size of resource stocks.
Proposition 5 (Equilibrium existence for convex marginal costs) Provided that the marginal cost function is convex and null in zero (f ≥ 0 and f (0) = 0) and that the function q → qg (q) is decreasing an equilibrium exists for any value of R 0 .
Proof. The proof strategy consists in proving that the deviations that are possible when the resource quantity R 0 is greater than R * 1 can be ruled out under some technical conditions. First, regarding the deviation with respect to the extraction quantity, when the marginal cost function is convex and null in zero, we show that the only terminal date which is compatible with the resource constraint is the date t * 2 of the optimal extraction path. Second, regarding the deviation with respect to the extraction date, when q → qg (q) is decreasing, we prove that the intertemporal profit is always positive and the firm always prefers to extract all resources than none. Both proofs are rather technical.
Proposition 5 states than an equilibrium may always exist under certain technical assumptions, no matter what is the quantity of available resources. The first condition has a straightforward interpretation in terms of convexity of the marginal cost. Moreover, even if the second condition may look fairly technical, it also has a straightforward and intuitive economic implication. Indeed, this condition translates into a condition on the "instantaneous" profit. If q → qg (q) is decreasing, then the "instantaneous" profit g(q)q − f (q) is a concave function of the extracted quantity, which is a standard condition in the industrial organization literature.
Conclusions
The present paper shows that equilibrium on non-renewable resource markets exists even when extraction costs are non-convex, once we realistically include resource inventories in the analysis. The setup does not rely on narrow assumptions so that all the proofs can be given under very general conditions. The optimum extraction path is non monotonic, which emerges to be perfectly compatible with constant resource stocks. Extraction necessarily involves increasing quantities at the end of the extraction period, which is a novelty in literature, before demand is met by sales from inventories. The underlying reason is that resource extractors need to increase extraction quantities in order to obtain discounted resource rents which are constant.
Two different development paths are found to exist, depending on whether initial resource stock is larger or smaller than a threshold value depending on cost and demand functions. If initial stock is low, the firm starts building up inventories from period zero on. The extraction path is increasing over time up to the point where firms stop extraction and start to sell out of inventories. If initial resource stock is high, exceeding the threshold, the previous pattern is preceded by a period in which extraction is positive but storage is not yet used. In that period, the extraction and sale flows are equal and decreasing over time.
The present paper addresses one of the main puzzles in resource economics: Why do we see many well functioning resource markets in reality despite non convex extraction costs? The paper complements alternative explanations for this empirical fact in earlier literature but avoids very specific assumptions like chattering controls or capacity constraints. It goes back to the original idea of including inventories and finds that this generally valid assumption is sufficient to prove the existence of equilibrium.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 4
In this proof, we check that the necessary conditions of equations (12)- (25) define an equilibrium. To do so, we verify that no deviation is profitable. Deviations can be of three types: (i) the firm may choose to extract but to leave resources below the ground, (ii) the firm may choose not to start the extraction and (iii) the firm may choose to stop extracting at another date than the optimal date t * 2 . These possible deviations are discussed in Sections A.1 to A.3.
A.1 First deviation: Extracting but less than R 0
We prove that given the price path P * , once the extraction has started, the firm will extract everything and leaves no resources below the ground.
We consider a deviation (q, s) corresponding to the extraction of the amount R ≤ R 0 , while the firm faces the optimal price path P * . We denote t 2 the end of the extraction and t f the end of the sale flow. Remark that the optimal price path P * depends on R 0 but is independent of R. The plan (q, s) is characterized using a program similar to (3) and involves distinguishing two cases depending on R 0 ≥ R * 1
or not.
First case: R 0 ≤ R * 1 . The intertemporal profit associated to this deviation is:
where we use the subscript R to highlight the dependence in R and where the controls (q, s) and the optimal price P * can be (indirectly for controls -directly for the price) derived from equations (12)- (17) and can be expressed as follows:
Using the above definitions, equation (38) 
e −δt (f (q t ) + c 0 )dt, whose derivation with respect to R yields:
since the resource constraint´t
admits at most one zero on [0, R 0 ] and R → J R [q, s] is either maximal in 0 or in R 0 . Once the extraction has started, the firm will extract R 0 . The firm will therefore extract either everything or nothing.
Second case: R 0 ≥ R * 1 . The extraction q is assumed to stop at a date t 2 ≤ t * 2 . Controls (q, s) and the optimal price P * can be derived from equations (18)-(25). We distinguish again two cases, depending on t 2 ≥ t * 1 or not.
Case t 2 ≤ t * 1 . The intertemporal profit J R [q, s] can be expressed as follows:
where q follows:
The derivation of (39) with respect to R yields:
since the derivation of (40) wrt R implies q
Case t 2 ≥ t * 1 . We have:
where controls (q,s) verify:
The derivation of (42) yields:
Moreover, we have by derivation of (43), q 
Conclusion of the second case R 0 ≥ R * 1 . From (41) and (44), we deduce that for any R ∈ [0, R 0 ] and thus for any t 2 ∈ [0, t * 2 ], we have
admits at most one zero for R ∈ [0, R 0 ] and R → J R [q, s] is maximal either for R = 0 (t 2 = 0, i.e., no extraction) or R = R 0 (t 2 = t * 2 , i.e., full extraction). Once the extraction has started, the firm will extract everything and leaves no resources below the ground.
A.2 Second deviation: Not starting the extraction
We now check that not starting the extraction cannot be a possible deviation. We denote J R 0 [q * , s * ] the intertemporal profit associated to the extraction of R 0 , when the firm faces the price path P * and follows the plan (q * , s * ). Note that in this case (compared to R → J R ), both the optimal plan (q * , s * ) and the price P * depend on R 0 . These quantities are defined in equations (12)- (17).
Since no extraction corresponds to a zero intertemporal profit:
The intertemporal profit can also be expressed as follows:
, we obtain:
du, we have:
Using that f is convex, we obtain:
,
where the last equality comes from the fact that π(q) ≥ 0 and q ≥ q * 0 . We deduce:
where the inequality sign is strict for any R 0 > 0. To conclude, we define R a = inf{R 0 ≥ R A.3 Third deviation: Extracting R 0 but opting for other extraction and sale paths
We prove that there exists a resource level R b > R * 1 (possibly equal to infinity), such that if R 0 < R b , a firm extracting R 0 always follows the optimal extraction plan (q * , s * ) and no deviation is profitable. The proof involves two steps: (i) we start with proving that there is no deviation when R 0 ≤ R * 1 ; (ii) we find a threshold R b > R * 1 such that no deviation holds when R 0 < R b .
A.3.1 No deviation when R 0 ≤ R * 1 . We denote (q, s) the optimal plan of the firm. We denote τ 2 the date at which the extraction q stops. The plan (q, s) is characterized by equation similar to (12)-(16). We distinguish two cases depending on whether τ 2 is smaller than t * f or not.
The extraction stops before t * f : τ 2 ≤ t * f . The extraction plan is characterized as follows:
Using that q = q * and e −δt P * t = e −δt * f g(0) for 0 ≤ t ≤ t * f , we deduce that the difference with the intertemporal profit derived from the optimal extraction plan
can be expressed as follows:
because of resource constraints. Therefore, the deviation never strictly dominates the initial allocation when R 0 ≤ R * 1 .
A.3.2 Ruling out deviations when
Dealing with the case where R 0 ≥ R * 1 is more complex and involves three steps: (i) we show that no storage occurs before date t * 1 ; (ii) we show that for a deviation to hold, the extraction must stop after date t * 1 ; (iii) for deviations whose extraction stops after date t * 1 , we show that they cannot occur provided that R 0 ≤ R b , where
is a threshold that we define. We consider that a firm facing the optimal price path P * defined in (25) chooses the plan (q, s). We assume that the extraction stops at date τ 2 .
No storage before date t * 1 . We start with the following lemma.
Lemma 1 (No storage before t * 1 ) Given a price path P * , it is never optimal for the firm to store before date t *
.
Proof. Using the expression (25) of P * together with (18), we obtain for any t ∈ [0, t * 1 ]:
) is a decreasing function (product of two positive decreasing functions), the function t → e −δt P * t is decreasing over [0, t * 1 ]. It implies that the firm prefers to sell as much as possible, rather than to save. There is therefore no storage before t *
No deviation when the extraction stops before date t * 1 : τ 2 ≤ t * 1 . Since there is no storage before date t * 1 (Lemma 1), using a similar technique as for the problem (4) of optimal extraction without storage implies that the extraction path q is such that e −δt (f (q t ) − P * t ) is constant for any t ∈ [0, τ 2 ]:
Since e −δt (f (q * t ) − P * t ) is also constant for any t ∈ [0, τ 2 ] (equation (18)), we have:
Using the definition (46) of the deviation q t for t ∈ [0,
We know that for any t ∈ [0, t Deviations whose extraction stops after t * 1 : τ 2 > t * 1 . Using a similar technique as in the optimal control problem (3), we obtain that the extraction q is defined as follows:
We conclude the proof in two steps. First we define R b and shows that it exists and is strictly larger than R * 1 . Second, we show that no deviation exists when the resource level is below R b .
Definition and existence of R b . We define R b ∈ R + ∪ {∞} as follows:
Notice that we allow for R b to be infinite. Note that the definition (49) hides several implicit dependencies. First, as defined in (48), the plan q depends on τ 2 . Second, q also depends on R 0 through t * 1 and q * t . Finally both dates t * 1 and t * 2 depends on R 0 . The meaning of the level R b is the following one. For any resource level R 0 smaller than R b , there are at most two dates (t * 2 and t * * 2 ) at which the resource constraint holds. It implies first that it is not possible to find a deviation which extracts resources faster than the optimal extraction q * : the other possible deviation will stop extracting at t * * 2 after the date t * 2 . Because of the time preference and of the fixed-cost c 0 , the firm may prefer deviations that extract faster than q * to q * . It is therefore important to rule them out.
Lemma 2 (Existence of R b ) The maximal resources level R b defined in (49) exists, is strictly larger than R * 1 and may be equal to infinity.
Proof.
First, it is clear from the case R 0 ≤ R * 1 treated above that the set {R 0 ≥ R * 
with e
] is equivalent to prove that Q is decreasing for q 1 ∈ [q * 1 , q]. We have
From (48), f (q t )
Moreover, from equations (24) and (21), we have:
) .
We deduce that
which can be made negative for any q 1 ∈ [q * 1 , q] provided that R 0 − R * 1 is made sufficiently small. Remark that it is not fully obvious because q 0 and q * 0 depends (negatively) on R 0 − R * 1 . However, since both q 0 and q * 0 decrease with R 0 − R * 1 , it is possible to assume without loss of generality that for not too large R 0 − R * 1 , q 0 and q * 0 are bounded by some q 0 and q *
. This latter lower bound is independent of R 0 − R * 1 and strictly positive since f is continuous and [q 1 , q 0 ] compact. We can then obtain an explicit bound on R 0 − R * 1 . When Q (q 1 ) is negative for any q 1 ∈ [q * 1 , q], τ 2 = t * 2 is the first date at which τ 2 0 q t dt = R 0 . We further need to prove that if R 0 −R * 1 is not too large, there exists at most one other date t * * 2 ≥ t * 2 (or another q * * 1 < q * 1 ), such that Q(q * * 1 ) = R 0 . From (51), the sign of Q is determined by the following expression
f (qt) dt− q 1 . Provided that f is continuously derivable, one can use the same technique as above and prove that when R 0 − R Q(q * 1 ) = R 0 , there therefore exists at most one other q * * 1 < q * 1 , such that Q(q * * 1 ) = R 0 . We therefore deduce that R b exists and is such that R b > R *
.
No deviation when R 0 ≤ R b . From the definition (49) of R b , it is sufficient to prove that the (possible) deviation that stops at date t * * 2 is dominated by the optimal extraction stopping at t * 2 . We formalize in the following lemma. 
, which is not possible. Therefore, we deduce (the inequality is strict otherwise Q would be constant and equal to R 0 over [q
We conclude that the extraction q * is strictly preferred to q * * .
Lemma 2 guarantees that we cannot find any extraction plan that terminates before t * 2 , while Lemma 3 ensures that the extraction plan q * is preferred to any extraction plan that stops after t * 2 : we deduce that there is no possible deviation for the extraction.
B Proof of Proposition 5
We prove that adding two assumptions on the shape of f and g implies that an equilibrium always exists, in other words that R = ∞. The proof is in two steps: (i) when q → qg (q) is decreasing, the upper bound R a is infinite and it is always optimal to extract R 0 ; (ii) when the extraction cost function f is such that the marginal cost of extraction is convex and null for zero extraction (f (0) = 0), the upper bound R b is infinite and it is always optimal to follow the plan (q * , s * ).
B.1 Decreasing q → qg (q) and R a = ∞ Lemma 4 If q → qg (q) is decreasing, then R a = ∞.
Proof. We first prove that the intertemporal profit is always positive for large values of R 0 . Second, we show that the intertemporal profit (as a function of R 0 ) admits at most one maximum between R 0 = R * 1 and R 0 = ∞. 1 ]. We assume without loss of generality that q ∞ < ∞. Indeed, in that case, the result holds since f (q * t )q * t − f (q * t ) − c 0 is positive for all t as soon as R 0 is sufficiently large. .
Since the derivation of (24) implies 1 = .
We now distinguish two cases, depending on the sign of q * 1 g (q * 1 ) + π(q * 1 ). does not admit any zero, R 0 → J R 0 is increasing for any R 0 ≥ R * 1 and is thus positive, since J R * 1 ≥ 0.
Consider now the case that
admits at least one zero. We consider the smallest extremum and we denote the resource quantity R e and the associated initial extraction flow q e . Since q * 1 − δR * 1
> 0, the first extremum cannot be a minimum (i.e., a maximum or a saddle point). Assume that there exists another extremum q e . From (58), we must have´q e qe ug (u)+π(u) π(u) du = 0. Since u → ug (u) + π(u) is decreasing, it implies that q e g (q e ) + π(q e ) ≥ 0 andq e g (q e ) + π(q e ) ≤ 0: therefore, if there exists a second extremum, the first one is a saddle point and the second one cannot be a minimum. As consequence, any extremum of R 0 → J R 0 [q * , s * ] cannot be a minimum and R 0 → J R 0 admits at most one maximum and admits a minimum value for R 0 = R * 
Proof.
The proof strategy consists in proving that no deviation fulfills the resource constraint.
We consider as a deviation (q, s), whose extraction stops at date τ 2 . We aim at proving that τ 2 →´τ 2 0 q t dt is strictly increasing over R + . Since Q(t * 2 ) = R 0 , there is no possible deviation and we must have q = q * . We already know that τ 2 →´τ 2 0 q t dt is strictly increasing over [0, t * 1 ] (see equation (47) and the discussion below). We now assume that τ 2 ≥ t * 
